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In a deterministic contest or all-pay auction, all rents are dissipated when
information is complete and contestants are identical. As one contestant be-
comes ￿stronger￿ , that is, values the prize more, total expenditures are known
to decrease monotonically. Thus, asymmetry among contestants reduces com-
petition and rent dissipation. Recently, this result has been shown to hold for
other, non-deterministic, contest success functions as well, thereby suggesting
a certain robustness. In this paper, however, the complete information as-
sumption is shown to be crucial. With incomplete information ￿regardless of
how little ￿total expenditures in a deterministic two-player contest increase
when one contestant becomes marginally stronger, starting from a symmetric
contest. In fact, both contestants expend resources more aggressively; with
complete information, neither of them do so.
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11 Introduction
Tullock￿ s (1967, 1980) famous pair of papers have triggered a large literature on
rent seeking. In large part, the focus of this literature is on the wasteful use of
resources to contest rents. Applications thus include war, lobbying, and campaign
spending, to mention but a few. Usually, complete information is assumed. That is,
the value that each contestant place on winning the prize is assumed to be common
knowledge.1 Simply put, the objective of the current paper is to make the point that
some of the important ￿ndings of this literature are not robust to the inclusion of
incomplete information. Indeed, in some respects the comparative statics of contests
with incomplete information are precisely the opposite of the comparative statics
that are known from contests with complete information.
Consider a deterministic contest, or all-pay auction. In such a contest, the con-
testant who expends the most resources wins the prize with probability one. Assume
there are two contestants, and that contestant i is known to value the prize at vi,
i = 1;2. These rules and payo⁄s de￿ne a complete information game. The game
has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies; contestants randomize to keep
the opposition guessing. See Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and de














If the contest is symmetric, or v1 = v2, then all rents are dissipated since EP c
1 +
EP c
2 = v2. However, in many cases the contest is not symmetric. Hillman and Riley
(1989) point out that an incumbent may value the prize more than a challenger. Nti
(1999) lists a plethora of other examples. As v1 increases beyond v2:
A. Neither contestant becomes more aggressive; contestant 1￿ s expected expendi-
tures are unchanged, while contestant 2￿ s expected expenditures decline.
B. As a corollary, total expenditures are strictly decreasing in v1, for v1 ￿ v2.
1For instance, in Konrad￿ s (2009) textbook, incomplete information is discussed only sparingly.
Likewise, in their collection of papers on rent seeking, Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad (2008)
include only two papers, W￿rneryd (2003) and Malueg and Yates (2004), which focus explicitly on
incomplete information. Malueg and Yates (2004) concentrate on the Tullock contest; see Fey (2008)
for a similar model. W￿rneryd (2003) considers common value contests in which one contestant
is uncertain of what that value is. Hurley and Shogren (1998) also examine one-sided incomplete
information in a Tullock contest. Hillman and Riley (1989) brie￿ y consider two-sided incomplete
information in a deterministic contest, assuming contestants are symmetric ex ante. The current
paper extends Hillman and Riley (1989) by allowing contestants to be asymmetric ex ante.
2The conclusion is that asymmetries among contestants are detrimental to com-
petition, and, as a result, there is less dissipation of rent in the ￿ght for the prize.2
Hillman and Riley (1989) thus conclude that asymmetries may explain the apparent
under-dissipation of rent in real-world contests. As will be explained in Section 4,
these comparative statics also provide a key building block in other studies, most
prominently in Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries￿(1993) seminal paper on the ￿exclusion
principle￿ . The robustness of the results is therefore of interest.3
The preceding contest is extreme on at least two dimensions. First, the contest is
deterministic; there is no room for luck or random factors to in￿ uence the outcome.
However, the comparative statics have recently been shown to be robust to changes
in the contest success function. Che and Gale (2000) and Alcalde and Dahm (2010)
each consider a class of (mutually exclusive) contest success functions for which the
deterministic contest is a limiting case. In both cases, there is an equilibrium for
which expenditures are given by (1) whenever the contest success function is ￿su¢ -
ciently close￿to the deterministic success function, in the sense that a contestant￿ s
winning probability increases dramatically enough when he unilaterally increases his
expenditures, starting from a position of equal expenditures.4
Second, the contest assumes information is complete. Although it may be reason-
able to ￿suspect￿that the incumbent values the prize more than the challenger, it
is quite a stretch to claim that the challenger knows precisely how much the incum-
bent values the prize, and vice versa. It is also hard to imagine situations where the
challenger is known to be the contestant with the lowest valuation with probability
one.
In this paper, the robustness of the comparative statics to changes in the under-
2As in much of the literature, the focus here is on the absolute level of rent dissipation, not the
relative level. Moreover, this paper is concerned only with one-shot, simultaneous contests. See e.g.
Amegashie (2006) and Konrad (2009) for discussions of dynamics in contests.
3This is not the ￿rst paper to question the robustness of these results. In reference to the
complete information model, Anderson et al (1990) state that asymmetries ￿can lead to unintuitive
comparative statics in a Nash equilibrium.￿They then develop a model with bounded rationality
which exhibits very di⁄erent comparative statics. For instance, a contestant who becomes stronger
will respond by becoming more aggressive, in equilibrium. In contrast, contestants are rational in
the current paper.
4Che and Gale (2000) consider di⁄erence-form contest success functions (CSFs), where the
di⁄erence between expenditures determines winning probabilities. Alcalde and Dahm￿ s (2010) class
of CSFs include the Tullock CSF, where the probability of winning is determined by the ratio of





e1)r)￿1, where r > 0. Remarkably, Alcalde and Dahm (2010) show that
whenever r ￿ 2, there is an equilibrium with the properties in (1). The all-pay auction corresponds
to r = 1. Nti (1999) obtains di⁄erent results for r 2 (0;2); see also Baik (1994).
3lying information structure will be examined. The ￿rst contribution is to present
a very general but surprisingly tractable incomplete information model, ￿rst intro-
duced by Kirkegaard (2010a). Besides its tractability, a distinct advantage of the
model is that the ￿strength￿of a given contestant can be captured by a single vari-
able, as vi does under complete information. It then becomes meaningful to speak
of a ￿marginal increase￿in the strength of a given contestant.5 Hence, comparative
statics questions parallel to those considered before can be addressed. The model is
presented in Section 2, while the comparative statics are described in Section 3.
It will be assumed that contestant i draws a privately known valuation from a non-
degenerate distribution with no mass-points and full support on [0;vi], v1 ￿ v2 > 0.
The two distributions will be assumed to have similar shape. However, they are
scaled di⁄erently, to ￿t onto their respective supports. It will be argued that vi
perfectly describes contestant i￿ s strength in this particular model. For instance, the
two distributions are identical if v1 = v2.6 Starting from v1 = v2, the consequences
of a marginal increase in v1 are:
a. The expected expenditures of both contestants strictly increase. In fact, con-
testant 1￿ s expected expenditures is strictly increasing in v1 globally.
b. As a corollary, total expected expenditures is strictly increasing in v1, when v1
is close to v2 and v1 ￿ v2. Total expenditures increase by exactly half as much
as would be the case if both v1 and v2 increase by the same marginal amount.
Clearly, incomplete information gives rise to precisely the opposite comparative
statics than complete information, at least when the asymmetry is small. Complete
5The di¢ culty with incomplete information in general is that a contestant is described by a
distribution function, not by a scalar. So, a marginal change in strength translates into a ￿marginal
change of a function￿ , which is clearly ambiguous. However, with the model examined here, strength
is captured by a single variable. At the same time, the model is quite general. Kirkegaard (2008)
studies comparative statics in even more general (less structured) incomplete information all-pay
auctions. The generality of that model, however, makes it more di¢ cult to obtain results and to
compare the available results to complete information contests. Nevertheless, Kirkegaard (2008)
appears the ￿rst to provide an example with some of the features exhibited by the model examined
here. The robustness of the results and their relationship to the literature on auctions with small
asymmetries are discussed in Section 4.
6Although Hillman and Riley (1989) consider incomplete information, they assume contestants
are symmetric ex ante ￿but not ex post ￿since valuations are drawn from the same distribution.
The distinction between ex ante and ex post is moot in a complete information model. Thus,
the appropriate generalization of the asymmetric complete information model is to an incomplete
information model in which the asymmetries exist ex ante and ex post, or v1 > v2. Such a model
makes it possible to analyze what happens as one, and only one, contestant becomes stronger.
4information corresponds to the case where the distributions are degenerate at vi. It
might be expected that (1) would obtain if almost all mass is concentrated close to
vi. However, this is not the case ￿the comparative statics uncovered here apply
as long as the distribution has positive density everywhere, regardless of how little,
and no mass points. Thus, there is an intriguing ￿discontinuity￿with respect to the
information structure. Complete information is a knife-edge.











where " is a small but positive number, " 2 (0;1]. The density is strictly positive
everywhere, as long as " > 0. As " ! 0, F(v) ! 0 for all v 2 [0;vi); hence, all mass
is concentrated close to v = vi. If " = 0, the distribution is degenerate (information
is complete). The point is that the comparative statics for " = 0 are very di⁄erent
from those arising for any strictly positive ".
The complete information model is analytically simple and o⁄ers what appears
to be a clear intuitive explanation for the comparative statics: asymmetries reduce
competition because the weaker bidder is deterred by the stronger bidder. However,
since the comparative statics are not robust, the intuition is evidently not robust
either. The relationship between the complete and incomplete information models
are discussed at length in Section 4, where the intuition for the new comparative
statics are developed.7 Implications of the results are also discussed in Section 4,
as is the connection to recent developments in the theory of auctions with small
asymmetries.
2 Model
The contest is assumed to take the form of an all-pay auction. Hence, the auction
terminology will be used. Two risk neutral bidders (contestants) are vying for a
prize by submitting bids (committing e⁄ort to the contest). The highest bid wins,
but both bidders pay their respective bids. A bidder is characterized by his type,
which measures the monetary value he places on winning the prize. If a bidder with
type v bids b, his payo⁄ is v ￿ b if he wins and ￿b if he loses.
7The current paper is part of a more general research program on the consequences of incomplete
information in contests. Kirkegaard (2010a) establishes that if a contest designer bene￿ts from
contestants￿expenditures, then he may pro￿t by handicapping the weak contestant. Kirkegaard
(2010b) shows that preferential treatment may hurt a subset of the contestants it was supposed to
help. Both results are impossible in complete information all-pay auctions.
5Bidder i￿ s type is assumed to be drawn from a twice continuously di⁄erentiable
distribution function Fi with support [0;vi], i = 1;2. The distribution function is
assumed to have no mass points and to have strictly positive density, denoted by
fi, everywhere. The assumption that the lower end-point of the support is zero is
deliberate and is of some importance. It is discussed in detail in Section 4.
Amann and Leininger (1996) provide an implicit characterization of equilibrium
in this general model. Both bidders submit strictly positive bids with probability
one (i.e. whenever their type is non-zero) and they both employ pure strategies that
are strictly increasing in type. The equilibrium is unique.
However, more structure will be imposed on F1 and F2 in the current paper, in
order to facilitate comparison with the complete information model. This model was






, v 2 [0;vi], (2)
where F is a distribution function with the aforementioned properties on its support,






denote bidder i￿ s ￿scale-adjusted￿type. By (2), the two bidders￿scale-adjusted types
have the same distribution. Without loss of generality, assume v1 ￿ v2. The bidders
are symmetric if and only if v1 = v2. The distribution F2 is a ￿scaled-down￿version
of F1 if v1 > v2; the two distributions have the exact same shape, but are of di⁄erent







, v 2 [0;v2]:
Note that F1 ￿rst order stochastically dominates F2 whenever v1 > v2. That is,
bidder 1 is less likely to have a low type than bidder 2; he is perceived to be stronger.
Let EVi denote the expected value of vi, i = 1;2, and let EVF denote the expected
value of a draw from the distribution function F. Then, substituting the scale-




















s = viEVF. (3)
6Thus, for a ￿xed distribution, F, vi is a natural measure of the (absolute) strength





denote bidder i￿ s relative strength, i = 1;2, i 6= j. The lower ri is, the stronger
bidder i is compared to bidder j.
Compared to the benchmark model with complete information, the partial overlap
of the supports implies that bidder 2 may happen to have a higher type than bidder
1, even if v1 > v2. However, the probability of this event can be made arbitrarily
small by concentrating most of the probability mass of F close to 1 (e.g. let F be
￿very convex￿ ). See also the example towards the end of the Introduction.
The remainder of this section is devoted to describing the equilibrium and the
expected payments, for a ￿xed (v1;v2) pair. A few preliminary results are also
presented. Following this part, the comparative statics are almost trivial to derive.
The comparative statics are described in a relatively succinct manner in Section 3.
Detailed discussions are postponed until Section 4, where the important di⁄erences
between the complete and incomplete information models are highlighted in an e⁄ort
to bridge the gap between contest theory (with complete information) and auction
theory (with incomplete information).
2.1 Equilibrium and expected payments
Since strategies are strictly increasing, bidder i with type v must submit the exact
same bid as bidder j with some, possibly di⁄erent, type, kij(v), i;j = 1;2, i 6= j.
Thus, bidder i wins if bidder j￿ s type is below kij(v). Since strictly positive bids are
submitted whenever v > 0, it must be the case that kij(0) = 0. Likewise, kij(vi) = vj
must also hold. Otherwise, one bidder would irrationally be submitting bids that are
strictly higher than is required to win with certainty.
Amann and Leininger￿ s (1996) contribution is to supply an implicit characteriza-
tion of the function kij(v) for all v 2 [0;vi]. The function is derived from the bidders￿
￿rst order conditions, which form an autonomous system of di⁄erential equations.
The boundary condition is kij(vi) = vj. In the present model, however, it is con-
venient to express the allocation in terms of the scale-adjusted types. Thus, de￿ne
ks
ij(vs) as the scale-adjusted type of bidder j that bidder i with scale-adjusted type
vs would tie with, vs 2 [0;1]. Substituting the scale-adjusted type, as in (3), into












for all vs 2 (0;1]. The details are omitted from the present paper, but they can be
found in Kirkegaard (2010a, Section 5).
For a ￿xed distribution, F, ks
ij(vs) is determined exclusively by the relative
strength of bidder i, ri. As the purpose of the analysis is to vary vi, the function will
be written as ks
ij(vsjri) whenever the reliance on the relative strength needs to be
made explicit. As bidder i becomes stronger, or ri falls, ks
ij(vs) must strictly increase
to maintain the equality in (4), for any vs 2 (0;1). Thus, for a ￿xed scale-adjusted
type, bidder i wins more often the stronger he is.
If v1 > v2 or ri < 1, ks
12(vs) > vs for all vs 2 (0;1). In words, bidder 1 outbids a
higher scale-adjusted type. Consequently, bidder 1￿ s distribution of bids ￿rst order
stochastically dominates that of bidder 2; bidder 1 is less likely to submit low bids.
The same property holds in complete information all-pay auctions. As v1 ! 1,
(4) implies that ks
12(vs) ! 1 for all vs 2 (0;1). In the limit, bidder 1 wins with
probability one. This is also the case in the complete information all-pay auction.
Lemma 1 summarizes these preliminary results.
Lemma 1 ks
ij (vsjri) is strictly decreasing in ri for all vs 2 (0;1). As ri ! 0,
ks
ij (vsjri) ! 1 for all vs 2 (0;1), and as ri ! 1, ks
ij (vsjri) ! 0 for all vs 2 (0;1).
Next, consider the expected bid or expected payment of bidder i, EPi(vi;vj).
There are at least two ways of obtaining EPi(vi;vj). First, Amann and Leininger
(1996) use kij to derive bids as a function of types. The expectation of these bids
can then be calculated. The alternative is to use Myerson￿ s (1981) insight that
the allocation in any given mechanism permits EPi(vi;vj) to be calculated directly,
without ￿rst having to deduce bidding strategies. Kirkegaard (2010a) uses the sec-
ond method to obtain the key property that EPi(vi;vj) is separable in the bidder￿ s
absolute strength, vi, and relative strength, ri. Lemma 2 summarizes Kirkegaard￿ s
(2010a) results.
Lemma 2 Bidder i￿ s payment can be written













EP s is di⁄erentiable in ri and has the property that EP s0(1) > 0.
8Proof. Here it will be proven only that EPi(vi;vj) is separable, as stated in (5).
Proving the remainder of the Lemma is more involved. The proofs are omitted from
this paper, but can be found in Lemma 3 in Kirkegaard (2010a).
Since a bidder with type zero earns zero rent, it follows from Myerson (1981) that





























































which takes the form (7).
Before examining the implications of Lemma 2, it is interesting to compare (5)
and its counterpart in the complete information model, (1). The latter can also be
written in a separable form,
EP
c



















is a continuous function. However, EP c is not di⁄erentiable at rc
i = 1, where it
peaks. In contrast, EP s does not peak at ri = 1. This di⁄erence helps explain the
di⁄erent results in the two models (see Section 4).










It is sometimes emphasized that all rents are dissipated in a symmetric complete
information all-pay auction, but not in a symmetric incomplete information all-pay
9auction. Bidders earn ￿information rent￿in the latter. Nevertheless, from (9) observe












Hence, as in the complete information contest, each bidder, in expectation, pays half
the expected value of the second highest type. The di⁄erence is that there is no wedge
between the highest and second highest type in a symmetric complete information
model.
There are also some interesting similarities between the two models at the other









2 ! 0 as v1 ! 1.
Turning to the incomplete information model, Lemma 1 describes the behavior of
ks













as v1 ! 1; (11)
since the term under the integration is a density (the density of the lowest scale-
adjusted type), which integrates to one. Likewise, since ks
21(vs) ! 0 as v1 ! 1
(bidder 2 never wins), it must also be the case that
EP2 ! 0 as v1 ! 1.8 (12)
Thus, the two models have similar features at the ￿corners￿(no asymmetry or
extreme asymmetry). However, they di⁄er markedly in their behavior as one moves
from one corner to the other. The comparative statics are described next.
3 Comparative Statics
Consider the individual responses to changes in vi.
8A formal proof of this follows from Myerson (1981). It is immediate from his formulation of
the expected payment that it must converge to zero as the winning probability converges to zero
for almost all types (recall that ks
21(v2) = v1, so bidder 2 with type v2 wins with probability one;
all other types wins with probability converging to zero). It is intuitive that bidder 2 would not be
willing to pay anything if he has no chance of winning.




Proof. By Lemma 1, ks
ij(vs) is strictly increasing in vi, for all vs 2 (0;1). Equation
(9) then implies that EPi(vi;vj) must be strictly increasing in vi as well. From (5),
@EPi(vi;vj)
@vj






By Lemma 2, this derivative is strictly positive when evaluated at vj = vi. At
vj = vi, EPi is strictly increasing in vj and strictly positive. As explained in Section
2, however, it converges to zero as vj ! 1. Hence, it cannot be monotonic in vj.
In a complete information all-pay auction, EP c
i is increasing in vi as long as
vi < vj. Thereafter, EP c
i is unchanged if vi increases further. In contrast, in an
incomplete information contest, EPi is globally strictly increasing in vi. EP c
i is non-
monotonic in vj; increasing in vj as long as vj < vi, and decreasing thereafter. While
EPi is also non-monotonic in vj in an incomplete information contest, it does not
attain its maximum at vj = vi. In particular, starting from a point of symmetry,
vj = vi, bidder i actually becomes more aggressive (in expectation) when his rival
becomes marginally stronger, which is precisely the opposite of what happens in the
complete information all-pay auction. Figure 1 illustrates the di⁄erence between the




















i ;EPi as functions of vi;vi. (b) EP c
i ;EPi as functions of vj;vj.
Figure 1: Comparative statics in complete and incomplete information models.9
9Formally, it has not been proven that EPi in general is single-peaked in vj. Figure 1 depicts
actual expected payments when F is a uniform distribution, in which case EPi is in fact single-
peaked in vj. Recall that EPi and EPc
i converge to each other as vi ! 1 or vj ! 1.
11Since both bidders becomes more aggressive as one bidder becomes stronger,
starting from symmetry, it is an obvious corollary that total payments must increase
as well. Contrary to the complete information model, rent dissipation may be an
increasing problem as bidders become asymmetric. In the present model, the increase
in total spending can in fact be quanti￿ed.
Proposition 2 Assume that v1 = v2. Then, a marginal increase in v1 leads total
expected payments to increase by exactly half as much as would be the case if both v1
and v2 were to increase by the same marginal amount.
Proof. Total expected payments in the auction are
ET(v1;v2) = v1 ￿ EP



















s (1) ￿ EP
s0 (1) + EP
s0 (1) = EP
s (1):
In comparison, if v1 = v2 = v, the total expected payments are 2vEP s (1), the
derivative of which is 2EP s (1) with respect to v. This completes the proof.
Proposition 2 describes the consequences of small asymmetries. Given the ￿nd-
ings in Section 2.1, the expected total payments can be quanti￿ed when there is no
asymmetry, or when the asymmetry is extreme.
Proposition 3 If bidders are symmetric, or v1 = v2, total expected payments equals













as v1 ! 1: (15)
12Proof. The ￿rst part follows from (10), the second from (11) and (12).
The relative size of (14) and (15) depends on the underlying distribution, F. For
instance, if F is the uniform distribution on [0;1], ET(v2;v2) = v2=3. In this case,
an extremely asymmetric all-pay auction yields higher higher total payments than
a symmetric all-pay auction. This conclusion holds whenever F is stochastically
dominated by the uniform distribution, as when F is concave.10
On the other hand, if F has most of its mass close to vs = 1, ET(v2;v2) will
be close to v2. In this case, a symmetric auction yields higher expected payments
than an extremely asymmetric one. In conclusion, large asymmetries may cause
more or less rent to be dissipated, compared to a symmetric contest. However, small
asymmetries will unambiguously cause more rent to be dissipated, by Proposition 2.
The distribution function F has most of its mass close to vs = 1 when information
is ￿almost complete￿ , in which case rent dissipation will be almost complete as well,
in a symmetric contest. Thus, this feature along with the ones mentioned in Section
2.1 are continuous in the information structure. The comparative statics are not.
4 Discussion and conclusions
The paper concludes with a discussion of some implications of the results. The
complete and incomplete information environments are then compared in terms of the
strategic considerations inherent in each. The di⁄erences between the properties of
the all-pay auction as a mechanism in the two models are highlighted. In the process,
intuitive explanations of the comparative statics in the two models are developed and
the robustness of the results to other ways of modelling incomplete information is
discussed. Another comparative statics is also presented.
4.1 The value of (a)symmetric competition
Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) consider a contest in which a contest designer
bene￿ts from bidders￿expenditures. Their model assumes complete information, but
allows for n bidders. As before, let vi denote bidder i￿ s valuation. For the purpose of
exposition, assume that v1 > v2 > ::: > vn, in which case the equilibrium is unique.
10Once again, it has not been proven that ET(v1;v2) is single-peaked in v1, although it is when
F is the uniform distribution. Whenever ET is single peaked in v1 and ET(v2;v2) ￿ v2=2, it must
be the case that a symmetric auction produces lower payments than any asymmetric auction. When
F is uniform and v2 = 1, ET(v1;1) attains its maximum at v1 ￿ 12:3. In other words, bidder 1
must be at least 12 times as strong as bidder 2 in order for further increases in v1 to reduce total
payments. This conclusion is in sharp contrast to the one obtained under complete information.
13Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) famously show that the contest designer may
bene￿t from excluding a subset of bidders from the contest, speci￿cally the stronger
ones.
There are two key steps in Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries￿(1993) proof. First,
in an all-pay auction with v1 > v2 > ::: > vn, only bidder 1 and bidder 2 will be
active. All other bidders will be scared o⁄, and will not participate (so there is
no need to explicitly exclude these bidders). Second, in the complete information
all-pay auction, revenue is decreasing in the stronger bidder￿ s valuation. Thus, by
excluding bidder 1, the contest designer may create a more even competition between
bidder 2 and bidder 3. Of course, he may continue to exclude bidder 2, to trigger a
competition between bidders 3 and 4, and so on.
Now imagine information is incomplete. It is known that the ￿rst step in the proof
does not hold in an incomplete information contest; see Parreiras and Rubinchik
(2010) and Kirkegaard (2010b). In the current paper, it has been shown that the
second step does not hold either. Naturally, this does not imply that Baye, Kovenock,
and de Vries￿(1993) exclusion principle is not robust, only that the method of proof
does not carry over. A new proof ￿or a counterexample ￿is not pursued in this
paper. However, these observations coupled with the results of this paper hopefully
demonstrate that the theory of contests with incomplete information constitutes a
rich research topic.
The results in this paper do, however, have direct implications for the selection
of bidders into a contest. Imagine a situation where a designer has to select a pair
of ￿nalists. For some reason (e.g. a¢ rmative action or personal preference) he is
obliged to admit bidder 3 as one of the ￿nalists. In a complete information contest
with n = 3 and v1 > v2 > v3, a contest designer who bene￿ts from bidders￿payments
is better o⁄selecting bidder 2 as the remaining ￿nalist, to create a more even contest.
However, this is not necessarily the case if information is incomplete; it may be more
pro￿table to create an uneven contest.
4.2 Strategic e⁄ects
The strategic e⁄ects of increased asymmetry are di⁄erent in the complete and in-
complete information models.
In the complete information model, bidders are willing to use mixed strategies
because they are made indi⁄erent between all bids in [0;v2]. If bidder 2 does not
change his strategy when bidder 1 becomes stronger, bidder 1 would ￿nd it optimal
to bid v2 with probability one. To restore the equilibrium, bidder 2 has to submit low
bids more often. In equilibrium, bidder 1￿ s strategy is unchanged, because the initial
14strategy already makes bidder 2 willing to randomize. The result is unambiguously
a decrease in expected total expenditures.
As discussed in Amann and Leininger (1996), incomplete information puri￿es
the strategies. That is, each bidder uses a pure strategy (which is a function of his
type). However, the di⁄erences run deeper than that. For instance, bidders earn
information rent, from which it is possible to conclude right away that the highest
possible bid, b, must be strictly lower than v2. Now, if bidder 2 does not change his
strategy as v1 increases to v0
1, bidder 1 would ￿nd it optimal to bid precisely b if he
happens to draw a type between v1 and v0
1. In other words, a mass of types would
bid b. Since v2 > b, bidder 2 would respond by bidding marginally above b if his type
is close to v2. In equilibrium, this e⁄ect forces b to increase. As the bids submitted
by high types change, lower types should also be expected to revise their bids.
Kirkegaard (2008) examines what happens as one bidder becomes stronger in the
sense that he draws a type from a stochastically dominant distribution. Kirkegaard
(2008) shows that this bidder￿ s new bid distribution will stochastically dominate the
old bid distribution. A bidder who becomes stronger is more likely to bid more ag-
gressively, implying that his expected payment increases. This result is independent
of how F1 and F2 are related. Thus, the ￿rst part of Proposition 1 is a special case.
However, it is harder to obtain results for the bidder who sees his opponent grow
stronger. To understand why, note that the strategic considerations depend on the
bidder￿ s type. In particular, the trade-o⁄ between bidding higher and winning with
a higher probability is determined by the bidder￿ s type. Thus, a bidder would react
di⁄erently to a rival￿ s more aggressive behavior depending on whether his type is
high or low. The previous argument shows that bidder 2 with a type close to v2 is
forced to bid more aggressively when he sees bidder 1 grow stronger. However, a low
type, one who does not value winning very much, may be better o⁄ bidding more
cautiously when his rival becomes more aggressive.
Kirkegaard (2008) examines another one-variable model. His results con￿rms the
intuition described above. Speci￿cally, consider some strictly increasing function,




, v 2 [0;v1],
i.e., F1 is a truncation of H. In this case, v1 is once again indicative of bidder 1￿ s
strength. Assuming the support of F2 is [0;v2], as in the current paper, Kirkegaard
(2008) shows that as v1 increases, bidder 2 will bid less aggressively if his type is
low, but more aggressively if his type is high. The new bidding strategy (and the
distribution of bids) will cross the old one exactly once. Unfortunately, in general,
15it is not possible to say whether bidder 2￿ s expected payment increases or decreases,
within that model. Thus, in general it is not possible to establish whether total
payments increase or decrease either. However, the recent literature on auction with
small asymmetries reveal that such inferences may be possible for ￿marginal changes￿
in bidder 1￿ s distribution. This point is discussed more thoroughly in Section 4.5.
The advantages of the model presented in this paper is its close relationship to
the complete information model, as described in Section 2, as well as its supreme
tractability. In particular, the model allows the conclusion that bidder 2 becomes
more aggressive, on balance (that it, in expectation), when his opponent grows
stronger starting from a point of symmetry. Kirkegaard (2010a) uses the same model
to examine the use of handicaps in all-pay auctions (see Section 4.4).
4.3 All-pay auctions as mechanisms
The complete and incomplete information models di⁄er not only in terms of the
strategic considerations of the bidders. Another di⁄erence between the models is
in the e⁄ectiveness with which the all-pay auction robs bidders of rent. From a
mechanism design perspective, a key determinant of expenditures in any auction or
contest is the allocation. Nevertheless, in the complete information model, the all-
pay auction extracts less rent from bidders than other mechanisms with the exact
same allocation. In particular, bidder 1 earns payo⁄of v1 ￿v2, in expectation, when
v1 ￿ v2. His ￿participation constraint￿is not binding. It becomes ￿more slack￿
as v1 grows, meaning that the e⁄ectiveness of the all-pay auction at extracting rent
diminishes as bidder 1 grows stronger.
Bidder 1 would be willing to pay a fee of up to v1 ￿ v2 to participate in the
auction, even though such a fee would not change bidding behavior or the allocation.














which is clearly increasing in v1, v1 ￿ v2. Thus, there are two di⁄erent mechanisms ￿
all-pay auctions with or without fees ￿for which the bidding strategies are the same
and for which strategies change in the same manner when one contestant grows
stronger. Nevertheless, the payments and comparative statics are di⁄erent.
In comparison, the participation constraints are binding in the incomplete infor-
mation model. This is due to the deliberate assumption that the lowest type is zero.
A bidder with type zero earns zero rent. Hence, no other mechanism could extract
more rent from bidders without changing the allocation. Contrary to the complete
information model, this property holds regardless of how strong the bidder is.
16With these observations, it is now possible to present an alternative intuitive
explanation for the comparative statics in the two models.
4.4 Absolute and relative strength: A perturbation
When v1 changes, bidder 1￿ s absolute strength and relative strength change as a
consequences. Given (5) and (7), it is worthwhile to decompose the two e⁄ects.
To get at the role of the relative strength, consider ￿rst a symmetric incomplete
information contest, with v1 = v2 = 1. Now, perturb the model to permit bidder 1 an
advantage. Speci￿cally, bidder 1 wins the all-pay auction if his bid, b1, exceeds h1b2,
where b2 is bidder 2￿ s bid and h1 2 (0;1] measures the size of bidder 2￿ s handicap
relative to bidder 1. As documented in Kirkegaard (2010a), it turns out that h1
determines the scale-adjusted allocation in precisely the same way that r1 does in
the asymmetric model; h1 takes the place of r1 in (4). Thus, changes in handicaps will
have the same e⁄ects as changing the relative strength of the bidders, but without
changing the absolute strengths. Since r2 = r
￿1
1 (bidder 1￿ s advantage or relative
strength is the reciprocal of bidder 2￿ s handicap or relative strength), total expected









p (1) = 0. From an auction perspective, this is unsurprising. Given
mild regularity assumptions on F, the all-pay auction, being e¢ cient (since v1 = v2)
and leaving no rent for the lowest types, produces the highest expected payments
that are possible in any mechanism where the prize is ￿sold￿with probability one.11
Any change to the rules of the games, such as imposing handicaps, cannot increase
the total expected payments. Since ET s0
p (1) = 0, small perturbations from symmetry
are essentially irrelevant.
Recall that the total expected payments in the unperturbed model is
ET(v1;v2) = v1EP






= (v1 ￿ v2)EP
s (r1) + v2EP
s
p(r1):
The signi￿cance of ET s0
p (1) = 0 is that a small change in the relative strength of the
bidders, starting from symmetry, has no ￿rst order e⁄ect. Thus, when v1 increases
marginally, starting from v1 = v2, it is only the change in bidder 1￿ s absolute strength
11This result is due to Myerson (1981). Note that Myerson￿ s (1981) regularity condition has not
been imposed here. Hence, ETs0
p (1) = 0 is a stronger result. Even if the regularity assumption is
not satis￿ed, ETs
p has a stationary point at r1 = 1.





is exactly half of what the impact would be if both v1 and v2 changed by the same
marginal amount.
In comparison, consider the same thought experiment conducted on the complete
information model, with v1 = v2 = 1. Once again, a handicap e⁄ects the all-pay
auction in the same manner as changes in the relative strength of the bidders does.























p(r1) is maximized at r1 = 1, just as in the incomplete information model.
The reason is once again that the all-pay auction maximizes expected payments
among all mechanisms. However, ET c
p(r1) has a kink at r1 = 1 ￿a small perturbation
does in fact have a ￿rst order e⁄ect. In this model, a perturbation changes the
relative strength but it also allows bidder 1 to appropriate rent. As discussed in the
previous subsection, bidder 1￿ s participation constraint becomes slack. This opens a
gap between the all-pay auction and the payment-maximizing mechanism with the
same allocation. It is this e⁄ect that accounts for the kink.12 This feature is absent
from the incomplete information model, where the participation constraint remains
binding for the lowest types.
4.5 Robustness to other models of incomplete information
Fibich et al (2004) consider a general incomplete information model in which F1 and
F2 have the same support, [v;v]. Given some ￿benchmark￿distribution, F, on [v;v],
assume that Fi(v) can be written Fi(v) = F(v) + "Hi(v), where " is a small number
and Hi(v) = Hi(v) = 0. The two bidders are symmetric if " = 0. Under certain
conditions, Fibich et al (2004) show that a marginal increase in ", starting from zero,
has the same ￿rst-order e⁄ect on expected revenue regardless of the mechanism that
is being used. One of the key conditions is that a bidder with type v earns zero rent.
Thus, their results are applicable to the all-pay auction only if v = 0. Lebrun (2009)
generalizes some of the results in Fibich et al (2004).
12In the complete information model with a fee described before, EPc
fee(rc
i) = (1￿:5rc









￿1) = 1, which is obviously
di⁄erentiable and ￿ at at r1 = 1.
18To compare with the current paper, assume that H1(v) ￿ 0 and H2(v) = 0 for
all v 2 [v;v]. Then, an increase in " means that bidder 1 becomes stronger in the
sense of ￿rst order stochastic dominance. It is straightforward to show that in this
case revenue must increase in a second price auction. Thus, the result in Fibich
et al (2004) and Lebrun (2009) imply that total expenditures must also increase in
an all-pay auction. In other words, the result that asymmetries increase total rent
dissipation is robust.
However, Fibich et al (2004) and Lebrun (2009) are concerned only with total
expenditures. In the model presented here, it is possible to establish the stronger re-
sult that both bidders bid more aggressively when one becomes marginally stronger.13
Moreover, the supports are permitted to be di⁄erent, thereby extending the scope of
Fibich et al (2004) and Lebrun (2009).14 Arguably, the assumption of di⁄erent sup-
ports, v1 ￿ v2, also makes the comparison to the complete information model with
asymmetric valuations, v1 ￿ v2, more immediate. Finally, the current paper explores
the intuitive di⁄erences between complete and incomplete information models.
It should be noted that as " or v1 increases in the incomplete information model,
the expected value of the second highest type increases. This is not the case in
the complete information model when v1 increases, v1 ￿ v2.15 Note that expected
revenue in a second price auction is identical to the expected value of the second
highest type, regardless of the information structure. The results mentioned above
signify that total expenditures in the all-pay auction increases at exactly the same
pace as the expected value of the second highest type when v1 increases marginally,
starting from v1 = v2. However, when F is uniform it can be veri￿ed that total
expected payments are strictly higher than the expected value of the second highest
type whenever v1 > v2.16 Hence, the increase in the expected value of the second
highest type does not account for the di⁄erence in the comparative statics between
the complete and incomplete information models.
13In fact, individual expenditures may di⁄er from mechanism to mechanism, even though their
sum does not. For instance, in the uniform model, bidder 2 will pay less in a second price auction
as v1 increases, for v1 ￿ v2. This is not the case in the all-pay auction (Proposition 1).
14Proposition 2 is consistent with Fibich et al (2004) and Lebrun (2009). It can easily be veri￿ed
that expected revenue in a second price auction increases by exactly EPs(1) when v1 increases
marginally above v2, just as in the all-pay auction.
15In the incomplete information model, however, the accepted notion of ￿getting stronger￿is to
draw a type from a stochastically dominant distribution, which must necessarily cause the expected
value of the lowest type to increase (when the supports of F1 and F2 overlap).
16Thus, the all-pay auction yields higher expected payments than the second-price auction. In
other words, more resources are expended in the contest than in any e¢ cient mechanism. The
exact opposite is the case in the complete information model, where the all-pay auction yields lower
payments that an e¢ cient mechanism.
194.6 Other comparative statics
So far, only a limited number of comparative statics have been compared for the two
models. The di⁄erences between the conclusions obtained are su¢ cient to demon-
strate the lack of robustness of the complete information model. However, there
are other comparative statics that could be derived to meaningfully shed light on
the consequences of increased asymmetry. For instance, Konrad (2009) considers a
complete information Tullock contest in which v1 = v + d and v2 = v ￿ d, d 2 [0;v].
Here, changes in d does not change the average valuation of the bidders.
In the context of the current paper, it is easy to see that total expenditures in a
complete information all-pay auction is strictly decreasing in d. However, this is not
the case in the incomplete information model.
Proposition 4 Consider the incomplete information model and assume that v1 =
v + d, v2 = v ￿ d, d 2 [0;v]. Then, small asymmetries are irrelevant, or
@ET(v + d;v ￿ d)
@d jd=0
= 0:
Proof. The Proposition follows directly from









































given that the term in the ￿rst parenthesis has a stationary point at d = 0 and the
term in the second parenthesis is zero at d = 0.
Once again, the ￿kinks￿in the complete information model cause small changes
to have large e⁄ects. In the incomplete information model, it has already been
demonstrated that there are no ￿rst order e⁄ects of small changes in relative strength
levels. The e⁄ects of the changes in the absolute strength of the two bidders exactly
cancel out, at d = 0. In this sense, small asymmetries are inconsequential.
4.7 Concluding remarks
The dominant assumption in the rent seeking literature is that information is com-
plete. Among the advantages of such models are their analytical simplicity. Although
the assumption of incomplete information is almost certainly more realistic, it is a
challenge to build a tractable model which allows comparative statics. Such a model
20is presented in this paper. The model features a one-variable measure of strength,
which means that comparative statics in the two models can easily be compared.
The results support the claim that incomplete information is important. The
comparative statics are qualitatively di⁄erent, in some cases diametrically opposed,
in the two models. Put di⁄erently, in the space of all possible distribution functions,
those that are degenerate give rise to di⁄erent result than those that are not. Any
amount of incomplete information changes the conclusions.
The main result is that ex ante asymmetries may cause more rent to be dissipated
in the pursuit of the prize, contrary to the conclusion that obtains in a complete
information model. Thus, asymmetry does not necessarily dampen competition.
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